The idea of _Merit_ is thus explained

The idea of _Merit_ is thus explained. Of two contracting parties, the
one that has first performed merits what he is to receive by the
other"s performance, or has it as _due_. Even the person that wins a
prize, offered by free-gift to many, merits it. But, whereas, in
contract, I merit by virtue of my own power and the other contractor"s
need, in the case of the gift, I merit only by the benignity of the
giver, and to the extent that, when he has given it, it shall be mine
rather than another"s. This distinction he believes to coincide with
the scholastic separation of _merilum congrui_ and _merilum condigni_.

"The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence,

although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which
sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour
"The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence,
although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which
sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour. Among others it
leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves
from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be
conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and
completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral
attributes.

Certainly no philanthropic association, however rationalistic and

suspicious of emotional appeal, can hope to help a girl once overwhelmed
by desperate temptation, unless it is able to pull her back into the
stream of kindly human fellowship and into a life involving normal human
relations
Certainly no philanthropic association, however rationalistic and
suspicious of emotional appeal, can hope to help a girl once overwhelmed
by desperate temptation, unless it is able to pull her back into the
stream of kindly human fellowship and into a life involving normal human
relations. Such an association must needs remember those wise words of
Count Tolstoy: 'We constantly think that there are circumstances in
which a human being can be treated without affection, and there are no
such circumstances.'